[1] 7.5 CWA 14167-1
7.6 CWA 14172-3
7.7 CWA 14890
7.8 CWA 14169 / ISO 15408
7.9 CWA 14171
[1] In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.2 SO1.1, the Digi-CA™ and Digi-CA™ Xg Trust Centre documentation provides documented instructions for the installation, administration and usage of the Digi-CA™ systems.
In compliance [2] with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.2 SO2, Digi-CA™ [3] can be configured to ensure business continuity so that services are quickly and securely restored in case of failure of the Digi-CA™ system.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.2 SO2.1, the Digi-CA™ provides for availability of the system services operation at 99.9% availability on a monthly basis and also ensures the following:
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.2 SO2.2 and SO2.3, the Digi-CA™ enables the continued operation of the Digi-CA™ because the entire system is replicated to a second set of Digi-CA™ servers and if required the entire Digi-CA™ can be migrated to a totally new Digi-CA™ environment at an acceptable level of risk because the information stored in the previously live system was publicly available information only.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.2 SO3, the Digi-CAST2™ Team will document the accuracy of the Time Stamping Device [4] once it is installed and tested and two sources of atomic clock are used to perform this task.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.3.1, the Digi-CA™, using two factor authentication [5] where applicable and defined administration roles, only authorized persons have any access to the system.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.3.2 IA1.1-3 & IA2, the Digi-CA™ requires each user to be identified and to be successfully authenticated before they are allowed any action on behalf of that user or role assumed by the user. There must be re-authentication after log-out and the authentication data, where used, is unique and cannot be reused.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.3.2 IA2.1-2, if the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts equals or surpasses the maximum number of allowed attempts, the Digi-CA™ system prevents further authentication attempts and if the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts equals or surpasses the maximum number of allowed attempts, and the role is that of an administrator, then a notification event is logged by the system and the access is denied until two alternative authorized personnel conduct and audit of the event and reinstate the Administrator who’s access has been denied.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.3.2 IA3.1, the probability of guessing any secret defined for any component of the Digi-CA™ is negligible.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.4.1, the system access control functions control the use of objects of the Digi-CA™ to authorized persons only. This applies to all sensitive objects of the Digi-CA™. System access control is provided by the underlying operating software and access rights to specific Digi-CA™ objects are determined by the owner of the object based on the identity of the subject attempting the access and the access rights to the object granted to the subject or the privileges held by the subject.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.4.2 SA1, the Digi-CA™ provides the capability of controlling and limiting access by identified individuals to the system/user objects they own or are responsible for and ensures they provide access protection to sensitive residual information by using secure, cryptographic based authentication methods along with defined administration roles.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.1, Digi-CA™ uses cryptographic keys to provide integrity, confidentiality and authentication functions within its own subsystems and in between subsystems and throughout the key life cycle management of private and/or secret keys is carried out securely.
The Digi-CA™ keys are separated into the following categories:
2. Infrastructure Keys – these are keys used by the Digi-CA™ for processes such as key agreement, subsystem authentication, audit log signing, encrypting transmitted or stored data, etc. Short term session keys are not categorized as Infrastructure keys
3. Digi-CA™ Control Keys – these are keys used by personnel managing or using the Digi-CA™ and may provide authentication, signing or confidentiality services for those personnel interacting with the system.
In terms of security requirements, ALL Signing Keys are long-term keys whose impact from exposure is high. Consequently, countermeasures for managing this risk are also high, both in number and in effect. Infrastructure keys are also considered high risk but due to their distributed functionality and shorter lifespan they are a lower risk in comparison to signing keys. The lowest risk keys, used by the Digi-CA™, are considered to be those used by personnel for controlling the Digi-CA™, as these are used by trusted individuals and have an even shorter lifespan. Session keys, used for single/short transactions are treated as sensitive information but with lower security requirements to the above stated categories.
Infrastructure and Control keys may be either asymmetric or symmetric keys.
Key Generation refers to the creation of keys.
Key Distribution
All Key Distribution is the function of distributing the Digi-CA’s™ Public Key, Infrastructure or Control keys.
Key Usage
This is the controlling of usage of generated keys within cryptographic algorithms to provide cryptographic services.
Key Change
Key change may be:
Key Destruction
When a key is compromised or when it reaches the end of its operational life it may be destroyed to prevent any further use of the key.
Key Storage, Backup & Recovery
After Key Generation, the keys may be stored in secure environments and may be copied and backed up to meet operational requirements. These backed up keys may need to be recovered when for example the existing key is inadvertently destroyed.
[1] At the end of a key’s operational life it may be archived to allow use of the key at some later (undefined) time. This is specifically in reference to Public Keys used to verify digital signature [6] but does not preclude archiving of other types of keys where justified.
In compliance [2] with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM1.1-7, Digi-CA™ [3] is configured to work with Eracom and nCipher HSMs and these HSMs comply with this standard whilst the Digi-CA™ ensure Infrastructure and Control Keys are generated and maintained in the HSM. All key generation meets the cryptographic requirements specified in [ALGO].
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM2.1-2.4, the Digi-CA™ private and secret keys are not distributed in plain text and Public Keys that have not been certified are kept secure to prevent interception or manipulation and the Digi-CA™ distributes the cryptographic keys in accordance with either the package or process cryptographic key distribution method.
The Public Key associated with all the Signing Keys and/or Infrastructure Keys (e.g. Revocation Status Service, Time-Stamping Service) can be made available to Subjects and Relying Parties. The integrity and authenticity of this Public Key and any associated parameters is maintained during initial and subsequent distribution.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM2.5, the Digi-CA™ the SSRoot is verifiable using data provided within the Digi-ID™ [7] and the Digi-ID™ subject and issuer fields are identical.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM2.6, the Digi-CA™ is capable of producing a fingerprint of a self-signed certificate using the hashing algorithms defined in [ALGO].
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM3.1-3, access controls to the Digi-CA™ are in place for all secure cryptographic modules used for all signing, infrastructure and control keys. The Digi-CA™ provides support for dual-person control when using control keys and this provides administration functionality of the Digi-CA™. Separate infrastructure keys are generated for separate functions and infrastructure keys associated with the Registration Service, Digi-CA™ and the Revocation Management Service are not shared.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM3.4-5, the Subject Device Provision Service, ensures that the subject keys for creating the Digi-IDs™ are separate from those used for other functions and that the key usage extension is present in the signature certificate being issued. If the key usage non Repudiation bit is asserted then it is not combined with any other key usage and authorised key usage only occurs within the operational life of the key.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM3.6, before the Digi-CA™ relies on Digi-IDs™ for asymmetric infrastructure or controls keys they ensure that the Digi-IDs™ related to these keys are still valid and this is done by checking the CRL.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM4.1-2, the Digi-CA™ enables the infrastructure and control keys to be changed on a regular basis and if any of the algorithms used in the Digi-CA™ are considered to have become unsuitable (as specified in [ALGO]), keys based on those algorithms are changed immediately. Key changeover is carried out securely and requires an out-of-band change.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM5.1-2, when all the Signing Keys reach the end of their life they are destroyed such that the signing keys cannot be retrieved and when the systems have been used to generate, use or store secret/Private Keys and are to be withdrawn from service or transferred their associated keys they too are destroyed.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM5.3-4, the Digi-CA™ provides the capability to zeroise plaintext secret and Private Keys stored in both the hardware and the software and the software key destruction is carried out using secure wiping processes that positively overwrite the keys.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM6.1-3, the Digi-CA™ facilitates the secure storage of all Private Keys and in conjunction with the HSM all the Signing Key are stored in, as is the private/secret infrastructure and control.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM6.4, if any private/secret key in a secure cryptographic module or HCD is exported from that module, it is protected by the module, to ensure its confidentiality, before being stored outside that module and any other sensitive key material is never be stored in an unprotected state.
All Signing Keys of the Digi-CA™ may be stored and backed up only when additional security mechanisms are in place. For instance, this may be accomplished using m of n techniques, where m component parts out of a total of n component parts are required for successful key initialization. For recovery from failure purposes, it is recommended that m= 2. If n = 4, then m = 3, if n = 5, then m = 3, etc.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM6.5-7, the Digi-CA™ ensures that backup, storage and restoration of private/secret NQC/QC Signing, Infrastructure and Control Keys is only performed by authorized personnel (e.g. Security Officer role) and ensures that backup, storage and restoration of private NQC/QC Signing Keys is only performed at least under dual-person control and does not contain functions that allow for backup or escrow of Subject signature keys (Private Keys).
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 KM7.1, the Digi-CA™ does not contain functions that allow for backup or escrow of Subject signature keys (Private Keys).
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 AA1.1, the Digi-CA™ logs the following:
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 AA2.1-2, the Digi-CA™ system maintains audit data and guarantee sufficient space is reserved for that data and the audit log cannot be automatically overwritten.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.5.2 AA3.1, the Digi-CA™ system service specific audit logging for all audit records that contain the following parameters:
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.6 AA4.1-2, the Digi-CA™ provides the capability to search for events in the audit log based on the date and time of event, type of event and/or identity of the user and the audit records are presented in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.6 AA4.1-2, the Digi-CA™ prohibits all user read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read access (e.g. those with System Auditor role) and modifications of the audit records is prevented.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.6 AA6.1, the Digi-CA™ generates an email alarm to the Security Officer upon detection of a potential or actual security violation.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.6 AA7.1, the Digi-CA™ ensures the integrity of the audit data for non qualified Digi-IDs™ and for qualified Digi-IDs™ ensures the integrity of the audit data by providing a digital signature, keyed hash or an authentication code with each entry in the audit log, computed over the entire audit log or over the current entry and the cryptographic result of the previous one and also provides a function to verify the integrity of the audit data.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.6 AA8.1, the Digi-CA™ the use of a trusted time source that is used to mark the time of audited events.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.7 AR1.1-4, the Digi-CA™ is capable of generating an archiving on media appropriate for storage and subsequent processing in providing necessary legal evidence in support of electronic signatures. Each entry includes the time at which the event occurred and does not include critical security parameters in an unprotected form. The following items are archived:
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.7 AR2.1, the Digi-CA™ provides the capability to search for events in the archive based on the type of events.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.7 AR3.1, the Digi-CA™ ensures each entry in the archive is protected from modification.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.8 BK1.1-3, the Digi-CA™ includes a backup function so that the data stored in the backup is sufficient to recreate the state of the system and a user linked to a role with sufficient privileges is capable of invoking the backup function on demand.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.8 BK2.1-2, the Digi-CA™ backups are protected against modification and are protected against modification through use of digital signatures, keyed hashes or authentication codes. Critical security parameters and other confidential information is stored in encrypted form only and the encryption meets the cryptographic requirements specified in [ALGO].
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.1.8 BK3.1-2, the Digi-CA™ include a recovery function that is able to restore the state of the system from a backup and a user linked to a role with sufficient privileges is capable of invoking the recovery function on demand.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.1 GE1, the Digi-CA™ ensures that all messages created by any core service is protected (e.g. by using message authentication codes, digital signatures, etc.) by using the service’s Infrastructure Keys, contains a message time, to indicate the time at which the sender created the message and includes replay attack protection (e.g. by using nonces).
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.1, the Digi-CA™ ensures that the Digi-ID™ application is carried out by the Registration Service after identification of the Subject has been carried out meeting the requirements specified in the associated Certificate Policy in accordance with ETSI 101 456 and that the Registration Service by its nature manages end entity subject data that may be affected by many different data protection requirements.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.2 R1, the Digi-CA™ ensure that if the Digi-ID™ application contains any subject sensitive information, the Digi-ID™ request is protected before being forwarded from the Registration Service to the Digi-CA™ thus ensuring message confidentiality but this functionality is only provided if required by the customer or the local legislation in the territory where the Digi-CA™ Xg Trust Centre resides.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.2 R1.2, the Digi-CAST3™ Team will ensure that the service implements a suitable mechanism to obtain proof-of-possession (POP) to ensure the entity requesting Certification is the actual holder of the Private Key related to the Public Key requiring Certification (an example of this would be to include a signature block with each Digi-ID™ application, which is created by the Private Key associated with the Public Key requiring Certification. Suitable algorithms for creating the signature are detailed in [ALGO]).
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.2 R1.3-4, the Digi-CAST3™ Team will ensure that the Registration Service is be configured to allow collection of enough data from the subject to satisfy the requirements for QCs as specified in Annex I of [Dir.1999/93/EC]. And the Digi-CA™ provides a mechanism to allow approval of Digi-ID™ applications using the RA Control Centre, by a Registration Officer, before leaving the Registration Service.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.2 R1.3-4, the Digi-CAST3™ Team will ensure that the Registration Service notes the time of the application and the information publication control to allow subjects to control the Digi-CA’s™ publication of the QC via the Dissemination Service.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.2 R1.6, the Digi-ID™ requests from the Registration Service are digitally signed for authentication and data integrity using its Infrastructure or Control Keys.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.2 R2.1, the Digi-CA™ implements mechanisms and security controls to protect the privacy and confidentiality of Subject information.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.2.2 R3.1, the Digi-CA™ logs all events relating to registration including Digi-ID™ re-key/renewal requests and approved requests for Certification.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.3.1, when using the Package Method, the Digi-CA™ generates the Digi-ID™ using the Public Key supplied. This ensures the CSP has ‘locked’ the binding of the Subject’s Public Key to its identity.
During the period prior to the expiration of the Digi-ID™, such period being defined by the Certificate Policy, the Digi-CA™ renewal of the new Digi-ID™ is produced using the existing Public Key or a re-key using the registration information used to generate the previous Digi-ID™. Digi-ID™ renewal covers Infrastructure, Control and Subject Digi-IDs™.
[1] In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.3.2 CG1.1-3, the Digi-CA™ ensures the integrity, data origin authenticity, and where necessary, the privacy and confidentiality of the Digi-ID™ [7] request message and the Digi-ID™ request is processed securely and checked for conformance with the applicable Certificate Policy. Before the Digi-ID™ generation, the Digi-CA™ [3] ensures Proof of Possession is validated.
In compliance [2] with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.3.2 CG1.4-6, the key used to sign a QC is only used for signing QCs and, optionally, the related Revocation Status Data and this service only generate Digi-IDs™ that are consistent with the allowed profiles as determined by the Security Officer. All Digi-IDs™ have the following properties:
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.3.2 CG2.1-2, for re-certification [2], the Digi-CA™ ensures process security against Digi-ID™ substitution attacks and the re-certification of Control and Infrastructure Digi-IDs™ with 5.1.5.2 KM.4 - Key Change.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.3.2 CG2.3, the Digi-CA™ ensures that all the Signing Keys are updated prior to their expiry. The related (renewed) Public Keys provide at least the same level of trust as when they were initially distributed. This is accomplished by providing at least the following intermediary certificates to prove possession of the new Private Key as follows:
2. Providing a Digi-ID™ of the new Public Key signed with the old Private Key
3. Providing the new self signed Digi-ID™ (signed with the new Private Key)
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.3.2 CG2.4, the Digi-CA™ re-certifying and/or re-keying of Subject keys, is as secure as the initial certificate generation and the Subject Certificates are renewed prior to their expiry. The Digi-CA™ automatically rejects a renewal request signed with an expired or revoked key.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.3.2 CG4.1, the Digi-CA™ logs the following events:
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.4.1 D1.1-2, the Digi-ID™ dissemination by the Digi-CA™ is limited to the Subject, and to Relying Parties according to the limits expressed by the Subject and the dissemination process manages the Digi-IDs™ accordingly.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.4.1 D2.1, if a repository is set up, an access control policy is defined to securely manage the access to stored data and read access privileges are granted to Subjects and to authorised entities according to the rules defined by the Subject and the Security Policy whilst write access privileges are limited to authorised roles, according to the definition of roles proposed in 5.1.1.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.5.2 RM1.1-6 and RM 2.1, requests and reports relating to revocation and/or suspension are processed by the Digi-CA™ in a timely manner and the maximum delay between receipt of a revocation and/or suspension request and the change to Digi-ID™ status information does not exceed 24 hours.
All requests for suspension, reinstating and revocation is authenticated and validated and once a Digi-ID™ is definitely revoked the Digi-CA™ ensures that it cannot be reinstated. Revocation of certificates related to all Signing Keys is only possible under at least dual control and status changes can be instigated by authenticated:
The Certificate Status database is updated immediately after request/report processing is complete. The Digi-CA™ is able to revoke any Digi-ID™ it has issued, even after a disaster.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.5.2 RM2.2, where Periodical Messaging is used, the Digi-CA™ supports the following requirements:
And all events related to certificate status change requests, whether approved or disapproved, are logged.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.6.2 RS1.1-3, Real-time or Periodic Messages provided to this service are only from trusted Revocation Management Services and if the Digi-CA™ is providing an ‘online’ revocation status service, it validates the integrity and authenticity of Real-time or Periodic messages sent to it and it ensures that replies to responses from the Certificate Status database are for the requested certificates.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.2.6.2 RS2.1-4 and 3.1, all certificate status responses from the ‘online’ Revocation Status Service are digitally signed by the Revocation Status Service using its infrastructure keys and signature algorithms/keys used for status response are compliant with [ALGO]. The response message contains the time at which the Revocation Status Service/Issuer signed the response. All ‘online’ Revocation Status Service certificate status requests and responses are logged.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.3.1.2 TS1.1-2, the Digi-CA™ controls the origin of each request before checking its correctness and verifies that the request for time stamping uses a hash algorithm that is specified as approved by [ALGO].
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.3.1.2 TS2.1-2, the Digi-CA’s™ trusted time source(s) are synchronised to Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) within the tolerance dictated by Certificate Policy e.g. to within 1 second and this is the same source as specified in requirement SO3 and the Digi-CA™ clock is synchronised with the UTC using a mechanism that is demonstrated to be reliable.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.3.1.2 TS3.1-3, the Serial Number used within the time stamping token is unique for each token issued by Digi-Sign and this property is preserved even after a possible interruption of the service. As well as Time Parameter inclusion, the time stamping token includes the accuracy of the time source used if this is exceeds that required by the time stamping policy. An indication of the policy under which the time stamping token was created is included.
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.3.1.2 TS4.1-6, the Time Stamping Authority [TSA] Signing Keys are generated and stored in a secure cryptographic module and the cryptographic module of fulfils the requirements of KM 1.2. The TSA Control Keys are stored in a hardware cryptographic device (HCD) and the TSA Signing Key is only used for signing time stamping tokens produced by the TSA. The TSA ensures that the time stamping token’s response contains the same datum that was sent with the request and that the signature algorithms/keys used by the TSA meets the cryptographic requirements specified in [ALGO].
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.3.2.2 TS5 and 6, the following Time-Stamping [9] Service specific events are logged:
And all Time-Stamp Tokens are archived in accordance with [AR 1.1].
In compliance with CWA 14167-1, Section 5.3.1.2 SP1-4, the Eracom and nCipher HSMs meet this criteria as certified in their FIPS accreditation and as the key pairs are generated within these certified HSMs this satisfies the requirement.
[1] On the basis that the Trust Centre achieves certification to BS 7799 or ISO 17799, the Digi-CA™ Administrators and Operators will have passed the required training and certification for the correct conduct and security practices required to work in the Digi-CA™ Xg Trust Centre.
[1] Digi-CA™ [3] uses vendor specific Cryptographic API to import keys and certificates into the Digi-Card™. The Digi-CA™ does not participate in the certificate usage process, which means that it does not provide applications that will use the card interface and installed keys and certificates to sign any data. On the assumption that only CWA 14890 compliant Digi-Cards™ are used in conjunction with the Digi-CA™, by association, Digi-CA™ complies with this standard.
[10] In compliance with CWA 15579 Digi-Bill™ uses both Qualified and non-Qualified Digital Signatures, as required by your national law. It also complies with 2001/115/EC [11], CWA 15580 [12] and CWA 15588 [13].
According to the Council Directive 2001/115/EC [2] “invoices sent by electronic means shall be accepted by Member States provided that the authenticity of the origin and integrity of the contents are guaranteed”. This could be guaranteed “by means of an advanced electronic signature within the meaning of Article 2 (2) of Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures; Member States may however ask for the advanced electronic signature to be based on a qualified certificate and created by a secure signature creation device, within the meaning of Article 2(6) and (10) of the aforementioned Directive”.
It further states that: “Authenticity of the origin and integrity of the content has to be guaranteed when using electronic data interchange (EDI) as defined in Commission Recommendation 1994/820/EC of 19 October 1994 relating to the legal aspects “when the agreement relating to the exchange provides for the use of procedures guaranteeing the authenticity of the origin and integrity of the data”. However, as per the Directive [2]: “Member States may, subject to conditions which they lay down, require that an additional summary document on paper is necessary” to be exchanged, summarising a set of invoices. Where the applicable law allows for it this summary document could also be exchanged electronically. It is to be remarked that usage of EDI is subject to meeting the previously italicised wording. To exchange this summary document electronically also electronic signatures can be used to guarantee authenticity of the origin and integrity”.
In compliance with CWA 15579, the Digi-Bill™ uses the required advanced electronic signature and timestamp and also ensures that:
[1] Digi-CA™ is configured to work many HSMs (nCipher, SafeNet, etc) and as this standard relates to the use of the Secure Signature Creation Device [SSCD] found in HSMs, the fact that these devices meet the standards [2] means that by association, Digi-CA™ complies with this standard.
[1] The Digi-CA™ complies with this standard by virtue of the fact that its Digi-IDs™ can be opened, examined and read by persons or handicapped persons using the functions within a standard Windows® PC and all of the required information in this standard is made available for this person to verify the Digi-ID™ [7].
With regard to the security requirements for the Digi-ID™ verification systems on the understanding that the Digi-CAST2™ Team conduct the installation, the integrity and authenticity of hardware and software are supervised at all stages and the security-relevant data and processes in secure areas is protected against unauthorised modification. If any unauthorised modification of the secure area hardware components occurs, the Digi-CAST2™ Team are trained to recognise them.
The components of the signature verification system use a combination of trusted devices and other hardware and software that are both physically secured and tested after installation using the checks and Procedures of the Digi-CAST2™ Team.
[10] In compliance with CWA 15579 Digi-Bill™ uses both Qualified and non-Qualified Digital Signatures, as required by your national law. It also complies with 2001/115/EC [11], CWA 15580 [12],CWA 15581 [14] and CWA 15582 [15].
According to the EU Council Directive 2001/115/EC [2] “invoices sent by electronic means shall be accepted by Member States provided that the authenticity of the origin and integrity of the contents are guaranteed”. This could be guaranteed “by means of an advanced electronic signature within the meaning of Article 2 (2) of Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures; Member States may however ask for the advanced electronic signature to be based on a qualified certificate and created by a secure signature creation device, within the meaning of Article 2(6) and (10) of the aforementioned Directive”.
It further states that: “Authenticity of the origin and integrity of the content has to be guaranteed when using electronic data interchange (EDI) as defined in Commission Recommendation 1994/820/EC [11] of 19 October 1994 relating to the legal aspects “when the agreement relating to the exchange provides for the use of procedures guaranteeing the authenticity of the origin and integrity of the data”. However, as per the Directive [2]: “Member States may, subject to conditions which they lay down, require that an additional summary document on paper is necessary” to be exchanged, summarising a set of invoices. Where the applicable law allows for it this summary document could also be exchanged electronically. It is to be remarked that usage of EDI is subject to meeting the previously italicised wording. To exchange this summary document electronically also electronic signatures can be used to guarantee authenticity of the origin and integrity”.
In compliance with CWA 15579, the Digi-Bill™ uses the required advanced electronic signature and timestamp and also ensures that:
[10] In compliance with CWA 15580 Digi-Bill™ complies with 2001/115/EC [11], CWA 15579 [18], CWA 15581 [14] and CWA 15582 [15].
According to the EU Council Directive 2001/115/EC [2] “regarding the storage of Invoices, every taxable person shall ensure that copies of invoices issued by himself, by his customer or, in his name and on his behalf, by a third party, and all the invoices which he has received, are stored”. This could be guaranteed “The authenticity of the origin and integrity of the content of the invoices, as well as their readability, must be guaranteed throughout the storage period. With regard to invoices that are not sent under either an advanced electronic signature, or by EDI (i.e. the “third option” – “by other electronic means”), the information they contain may not be altered and must remain legible throughout the aforementioned period”.
In compliance with CWA 15580, the Digi-Bill™ uses the required advanced electronic signature and timestamp and also ensures that:
[10] In compliance with CWA 15582 Digi-Bill™ complies with 2001/115/EC [11], CWA 15579 [18], CWA 15580 [12] and CWA 15582 [15].
In compliance with CWA 15581, the Digi-Bill™ uses the required advanced electronic signature and timestamp and also ensures that:
[10] In compliance with CWA 15582 Digi-Bill™ complies with 2001/115/EC [11], CWA 15579 [18], CWA 15580 [12] and CWA 15581 [14].
In compliance with CWA 15582, the Digi-Bill™ uses the required advanced electronic signature and timestamp and also ensures that:
Links:
[1] https://www.digi-sign.com/downloads/download.php?id=digi-ca-pdf
[2] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/introduction
[3] http://www2.digi-sign.com/digi-ca
[4] http://www2.digi-sign.com/digi-ca/time+stamp
[5] http://www2.digi-sign.com/two+factor+authentication
[6] http://www2.digi-sign.com/digital+certificate
[7] http://www2.digi-sign.com/digi-id
[8] http://www2.digi-sign.com/digi-ca/administrator/online+certificate+status+protocol
[9] http://www2.digi-sign.com/digi-ca/administrator/time+stamp
[10] https://www.digi-sign.com/downloads/download.php?id=digi-bill-pdf
[11] http://www2.digi-sign.com/http
[12] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/cwa+15580
[13] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/cwa+15588
[14] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/cwa+15581
[15] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/cwa+15582
[16] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/etsi/101+861
[17] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/etsi/102+023
[18] http://www2.digi-sign.com/compliance/cwa+15579